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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines how companies' capital structure is affected by the corporate income tax 
system. Our analysis employs confidential company-level corporation tax return data in the 
UK. Our main identification strategy is based on variation in companies’ marginal tax rates 
due to the existence of kinks in the corporate tax rate schedule. Using a dynamic adjustment 
model of capital structure, we find a positive and substantial long-run tax effect on 
companies' financial leverage. We show that there are considerable discrepancies between 
estimates of taxable profits reported in tax return data and in financial statements and that the 
estimated tax effect on capital structure using financial statements is likely to be biased 
downward. We find that companies adjust their capital structures gradually in response to 
changes in the marginal tax rate. Moreover, we find that the external leverage of domestic 
stand-alone companies and of multinational companies responds strongly to corporate tax 
incentives.  
 
JEL category: G3, H2 
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Corporation taxes typically permit to deduct interest payments but not the opportunity cost of 
equity finance. They therefore create an incentive to using debt, rather than equity, finance. 
The potential costs of using excessive debt became more apparent in the recent financial 
crisis and equalising the tax treatment of debt and equity has been the subject of numerous 
tax proposals (see, for example, Mirrlees et al., 2011). Although theories of capital structure 
predict tax effects to be of first-order importance, researchers have found it difficult to 
identify clear effects of taxation on the choice between debt and equity finance.
2
 Previous 
empirical research has however faced the difficulty in identifying with any precision the 
variation across companies in the marginal tax rate that they face, and it has typically found 
rather small effects of taxation on capital structure.
3
 
 
This paper examines how companies' capital structures are affected by the corporate income 
tax system using confidential corporation tax return data for a panel of UK companies. These 
data allow us to measure precisely the tax incentives faced by companies with different tax 
status, and hence to make two related important innovations to reduce measurement error 
relative to the previous literature.  
 
Our first key contribution to reducing measurement error is the use of corporate tax returns. 
The previous literature has largely relied for information about taxation on accounting 
financial statements, rather than tax returns. For a number of legitimate reasons there are both 
temporary and permanent differences between the tax charge in a profit and loss statement 
and the current tax liability of the company. We find a substantial proportion of companies 
either “over-report” or “under-report” their taxable income in the financial statements relative 
to their actual tax liability. Compounding the problem of using financial statements, the 
previous literature has largely used data from the consolidated accounts of large companies. 
To the extent to which companies borrow in different countries, their aggregate borrowing 
should depend on tax rates in those different countries, rather than simply the tax rate in the 
country of the parent company. By contrast, we exploit unconsolidated data of individual UK 
                                                          
2
 Myers (1984) challenges researchers to show that capital structure is affected by taxes as the trade-off theory 
predicts. Graham (2003) points out that, notwithstanding the increasing evidence after Myers (1984) for the 
existence of tax effects on capital structure, it would still be helpful to investigate whether these tax effects are 
economically important. 
3
 For example, Graham (1996a) finds a positive correlation between the simulated marginal tax rate and 
incremental changes in debt, although the point estimate is rather small, at around only 0.07. Graham et al. 
(1998) estimates directly the relationship between the simulated marginal tax rate and the leverage ratio and 
finds a positive, although small effect on leverage - again, around 0.07. 
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companies – on taxation from tax returns and on other variables from unconsolidated 
financial accounts.   
 
We are aware of only three papers that use tax return data to examine the impact of taxation 
on capital structure. Two of these - Gordon and Lee (2001) and Dwenger and Stainer (2014) 
– use data aggregated over companies.4 Both studies find positive, though again small, effects 
of the tax rate on capital structure. Gordon and Lee (2001) follow a similar approach to that 
used in this paper, exploiting the fact that in the US small companies have faced different tax 
rates than larger companies. For example, during the late 1970s, the corporate tax rate was 
22% on the first $50,000 of income, but 46% on any additional income. However, the 
aggregated nature of these studies may hide important heterogeneities across companies. In 
contrast, the company-level data used in this paper allows us not only to observe more 
accurately each company’s tax status but also to control for important company-level non-tax 
characteristics that are likely to affect companies’ financing decisions. 
 
The only other study that has attempted to use company-level tax return data to estimate the 
tax effect on capital structure is Graham and Mills (2008). The authors simulated the 
effective marginal tax rate separately using tax return data and financial statements, for a 
sample of US public companies during the period 1998-2000. Their identification relies on 
cross-section variation in the simulated marginal tax rate due to the asymmetric tax treatment 
between profit and loss. The approach using the simulated marginal tax rate based on 
financial statements generates a larger and more significant point estimate than using tax 
returns. However, the comparison between the two types of accounts could be problematic 
because the tax return data and the financial statement data use different consolidation rules. 
As recognized by the authors, US companies in their sample typically include all controlled 
domestic and foreign entities in their financial statements. In contrast, for tax purposes, a U.S. 
parent corporation can elect to file a consolidated tax return that includes net income or loss 
only from all its domestic subsidiaries plus repatriations of profits from the foreign 
subsidiaries. Due to the difference in the consolidation rules, the authors acknowledge that 
the two simulated marginal tax rates may not be directly comparable. The authors also 
recognize that it may not be appropriate to match the simulated marginal tax rate based the 
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 Tax return data in these studies are aggregated according to firms’ asset sizes or their industries and locations 
of headquarters. 
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tax return filed in the US with the company’s worldwide leverage ratio, if the company 
operates in different tax jurisdictions.  
 
Our second innovation is that, as our main identification strategy, we exploit kinks in the 
corporation tax rate schedule in the UK - where there are jumps in the marginal tax rate - to 
estimate the effects of corporate taxation on capital structure. Kinks in the marginal tax rate 
schedule are significant. For example, at the £300,000 kink in the tax rate schedule, the 
marginal tax rate has typically jumped by 12 to 13 percentage points. There is therefore a 
considerably higher incentive to use debt finance for companies above, compared to below, 
the kink. Due to the existence of these kinks, we can accurately exploit cross-section as well 
as time-series variation in the marginal tax rate facing a company in each period. Time series 
variation arises partly because there have been a number of reforms to the tax rate schedule. 
In addition, conditional on the tax rate schedule, as the taxable profit of a company changes 
over time then it may find itself in a different tax bracket and therefore facing a different 
marginal tax rate.  
 
Previous studies have instead primarily focused on variation in the marginal tax rate arising 
from the asymmetric treatment of losses.
5
 We also follow this approach as a second 
identification strategy and to compare our results with the previous literature. A marginal 
increase in the interest cost of a loss-making company does not typically have an immediate 
impact on tax liabilities, but instead increases the tax loss carried forward to set against profit 
in subsequent periods. Cross-section variation in the “effective” marginal tax rate is therefore 
introduced and it depends on how long the company expects to reach a positive taxable profit. 
There have been a number of attempts to estimate such effective tax rates, the best-known 
being Graham (1996a).
6
 Any methodology to identify the effective tax rate of loss-making 
companies, however, requires assumptions about the distribution of a company’s taxable 
income. For example, Graham (1996a, 1996b) and Graham et al. (1998) assume that the level 
                                                          
5
 A different approach in the empirical literature has instead relied for identification on variation in the statutory 
corporate income tax rate across countries (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales, 1995, and Faccio and Xu, 
2013). While the statutory corporate income tax rate has varied little over time in some countries such as the US, 
it does differ substantially across countries. However, a potential drawback of such an approach is that the 
statutory top marginal corporate income tax rate may be a poor proxy for the true corporation tax incentives 
faced by companies. For example, the top statutory marginal corporate income tax rate does not take into 
account the existence of kinks in the tax rate schedule or incorporate specific provisions of the tax code, such as 
loss carry forwards. 
6
 See also the earlier studies that exploit cross-section variation in marginal tax rates due to losses (Shevlin, 
1987, 1990; Devereux, 1989; Devereux et al., 1994; and Altshuler and Auerbach, 1990). 
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of a company’s future taxable income follows a random walk. However, recent studies (for 
example, Blouin et al., 2010) have shown that this assumption may bias upward the simulated 
effective marginal tax rate.  
 
Apart from making use of more precise measures of the corporation tax rate, we make two 
other important innovations relative to the previous literature. First, we apply panel data 
estimation techniques to control for company-level fixed effects, which are found by 
Lemmon et al. (2008) to be important in explaining companies’ capital structure. Further, in 
contrast to most previous studies which estimate the tax effects on capital structure based on 
a static model (for example, Graham 1996a; and Faccio and Xu, 2013), we estimate a 
dynamic adjustment model that allows companies to gradually adjust their leverage ratio 
towards the optimal.
7
 This allows us to investigate not only how large are the long term 
effects of corporation tax on leverage, but also the speed of adjustment.
8
 For comparison with 
the previous literature, we also present results using a static model. 
  
Second, we investigate heterogeneity between UK stand-alone companies and UK companies 
that are part of a multinational group. In our main analysis we use the combination of internal 
and external debt of a company, based on the unconsolidated company-level financial 
statements. However, since a multinational may use internal debt to shift profit to low-taxed 
jurisdictions, then for the purposes of comparison with domestic companies – and to identify 
only debt that affects default risk - we analyse only external debt in this separate exercise. We 
are not aware of any previous study that has compared the sensitivity of external debt to tax 
incentives between domestic and multinational firms. This exercise is also necessary to 
compare our results with previous work that focuses on the external leverage ratio of the 
company, based on consolidated financial statements.
9
  
 
                                                          
7
 This approach is based on studies of capital structure that estimate the speed of adjustment as a test between 
the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory since the trade-off theory, but not the pecking order theory, 
predicts that leverage should be mean-reverting (see, Fama and French, 2002, Flanery and Rangan, 2006, and 
Lemmon et al., 2008). 
8
 Although this approach has been adopted to examine the tax effects on banks recently (Keen and de Mooij, 
2015), to our knowledge, we are not aware of any study using this approach to estimate the tax effects on non-
financial firms. 
9
 Empirical studies based on firms’ consolidated financial statements from data sources like Compustat and 
Datastream would estimate the effects of corporate tax incentives on firms’ overall external leverage. This 
approach would create a potential measurement error as multinationals may be able to undertake external 
borrowing in many jurisdictions and hence, they may respond to the tax rate in the location in which they 
borrow rather than the tax rate in the country of the parent company. 
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Our results suggest a much larger impact of taxation on leverage than is found in the previous 
literature. In our main specification with identification coming from kinks in the marginal tax 
rate schedule, we find large, positive and highly significant effects of taxation. In the long run 
we estimate that a one percentage point rise in the corporation tax rate would increase the 
leverage ratio by around 1 percentage point (our central estimates range from 0.76 to 1.40, 
depending in the instruments used). In these estimates we find that firms close about 24% of 
the gap between their actual leverage ratio and the targeted level each year, similar to the 
estimated adjustment speed found in Lemmon et al. (2008).  
 
We undertake four exercises to compare our results with the previous literature. First, we find 
similar effects when we also allow for variation in marginal tax rates due to the asymmetric 
treatment of losses (where estimates of the long-run effect of a one percentage point rise in 
the tax rate are 0.98 and 1.12 percentage points).  Second, we re-estimate our model based on 
estimates of the marginal tax rate derived from financial statements. Here we find that the 
model performs much better using the tax return data. This strongly suggests that companies 
respond to real tax liabilities rather than charges in accounting statements, contrary to the 
previous evidence of Graham and Mills (2008).  Third, we estimate a static model, similar to 
that used in most of the literature. Here we continue to find positive effects of taxation, 
though rather smaller than in the dynamic model. Fourth, we estimate the effects of taxation 
on external debt separately for domestic stand-alone companies and companies that are part 
of multinational groups. We present some evidence that the external debt of multinationals is 
less sensitive to taxation, perhaps because multinationals have the opportunity to borrow 
elsewhere and use internal debt to allocate funds within the group.
10
  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I describes our identification strategies 
in more detail. Section II describes the data and sample selection. Section III reports our 
benchmark estimation results. Section IV presents various extensions described above which 
serve as a comparison to the previous literature. Section V concludes. 
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 For example, Desai et al. (2004) point out that multinational firms employ internal capital markets 
opportunistically to overcome imperfections in external capital markets. 
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I. Identification strategies 
 
Our main identification strategy relies on the fact that there are a number of kinks in the 
corporation tax rate schedule in the UK during the fiscal years 2001/2002-2009/2010. Table I 
reports the statutory marginal tax rate associated with each bracket of taxable profit during 
this period. Figure 1 illustrates the marginal tax rate schedule graphically. Figure 1 shows 
some substantial jumps in the statutory marginal tax rate, for example at the £300,000 
threshold for taxable profit. Another significant kink arises due to the zero starting rate for 
companies with less than £10,000 taxable profits in place between fiscal year 2002/2003 and 
2005/2006. Our main identification strategy for the tax effect on leverage ratio relies on the 
fact that companies face different incentives to use debt finance depending on the tax bracket 
and hence marginal tax rate. If a company changes tax bracket and the benefits of adjusting 
the leverage ratio outweigh the associated costs, this company would have an incentive to 
adjust its leverage ratio according to the trade-off theory. As noted above, our identification 
strategy is in the spirit of Gordon and Lee (2001).
11
 
 
To carry out our main identification strategy, we construct a sample of companies that report 
only positive taxable profits in the tax returns (Sample I). The purpose of this selection is to 
avoid measurement error in companies’ effective marginal tax rates which is likely to arise if 
loss-making company-year observations are included, where the relevant tax measure 
depends on companies’ perception of the distribution of their future taxable profits (Shevlin, 
1987, 1990; Graham1996a; and Graham et al.,1998). Given access to tax return data, we 
obtain identification largely free of measurement error for companies with positive taxable 
profit.
12
  
 
As recognized by previous studies (Graham et al., 1998; and Gordon and Lee, 2001), the 
marginal tax rate calculated using taxable profits after interest deduction may suffer from 
endogeneity problems. This is because a company with higher leverage would tend to have 
higher interest payments and hence lower after-financing taxable profits, mechanically 
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 It is possible in principle that the corporation tax gains to greater use of debt are outweighed to some extent by 
the taxation of the interest received by the lender (Miller, 1977). However, if we assume that the variation in 
corporation tax rates is uncorrelated with variation in tax rates of the lenders, then our empirical strategy 
remains valid.  
12
 A potential selection problem arises from this strategy as profit-making firms may differ from firms that 
experienced losses. To examine this issue, we compare the observed firm-level characteristics between Sample I 
and a larger sample with loss-making firm-year observations (Sample II) in Section II.A. 
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implying that the leverage ratio is negatively correlated with the after-financing marginal tax 
rate. Moreover, with the presence of kinks in the tax rate schedule, companies could be 
induced to use more debt to shift into the tax bracket with a lower tax rate. To deal with such 
endogeneity of the after-financing marginal tax rate, researchers (such as Graham et al., 1998; 
and Gordon and Lee, 2001) have used a “before-financing” marginal tax rate based on 
companies’ taxable profits before deducting interest expenses as an instrument. We adopt this 
convention, constructing the before-financing marginal tax rate as an instrument for the after-
financing marginal tax rate. 
 
 
Figure 1. Statutory corporate income tax rate in the UK. This figure shows the statutory marginal 
tax rates for different corporate income tax brackets during the fiscal years 2001/2002-2009/2010 in 
the United Kingdom. 
 
The marginal tax rate, whether it is measured before- or after-financing, is also likely to be 
endogenous because taxable profits may be correlated with unobserved shocks that can also 
affect companies’ leverage. For example, companies that experience large positive demand 
shocks may accumulate higher internal funds and taxable profits. The pecking-order theory of 
capital structure predicts that such companies would tend to have lower leverage. To deal 
with this type of endogeneity, we estimate the effect of the marginal tax rate on leverage ratio 
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using the first-difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Arrellano and 
Bond, 1991), and instrument the company’s contemporaneous after-financing marginal tax 
rate by its historical after-financing (or before-financing) marginal tax rate. The validity of 
this strategy relies on the following two assumptions: first, a company’s taxable profits across 
different years are correlated and hence, its historical marginal tax rates are informative about 
its current marginal tax rate; and second, any unobserved contemporaneous shock that 
changes the company’s leverage ratio, such as a windfall of cash, is not serially correlated 
beyond a certain period of time.
13
 
 
As a supplement to our main identification strategy, we construct a second sample that 
contains both profit-making and loss-making companies (Sample II). Variation in the 
marginal tax rate for companies in Sample II comes from two sources: the existence of kinks 
in the corporate tax rate schedule; and the asymmetric tax treatment between profits and 
losses. The statutory marginal tax rate of zero could be below the true marginal tax rate for 
companies in the loss-making position since it does not take into account the possibility of 
carrying losses forward or backward. The most sophisticated approach to incorporate such 
dynamics in the tax code is to simulate companies' future taxable profits and then calculate 
the effective marginal tax rate accordingly. Graham (1996a) and Graham et al. (1998) 
provide a detailed explanation of this approach. However, it requires strong assumptions 
about the distribution of companies' taxable profits as well as about companies’ expectations, 
and preferably also many years of observations for each company.
14
  
 
We do not pursue such a strategy due to these concerns. Instead, for loss-making companies, 
we use in turn both the statutory marginal tax rate of zero and the “perfect-foresight” 
marginal tax rate. The “perfect-foresight” marginal tax rate is calculated in the spirit of the 
simulated marginal tax rate (Graham, 1996a, 1996b; and Graham et al., 1998) assuming 
companies have unbiased estimates of their future taxable income. Graham (1996b) finds that 
the simulated marginal tax rates are highly correlated with the “perfect-foresight” marginal 
tax rates assuming companies can predict their future taxable income. Under this assumption, 
when in a loss position, a firm’s marginal tax rate depends on when it will realize positive 
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 More specifically, the set of instruments that contains the lags of the after-financing marginal tax rate will be 
chosen according to the test of serial correlation in the unobserved error term in the dynamic adjustment model 
of capital structure. 
14
 The simulated marginal tax rate usually requires a reasonably long time-series for each firm to forecast future 
taxable income. This is a luxury we do not have since we only have a maximum 9 years of tax returns or 10 
years of accounting data for individual firms. 
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taxable income, which is recorded in the tax returns. We discuss the construction of the 
“perfect-foresight” marginal tax rate in Section IV.A. 
 
II. Sample Construction and Data Description 
 
A.   Sample Construction 
  
We use confidential tax returns for a panel of UK companies to identify the heterogeneous 
tax incentives faced by companies. The tax return data is collected by Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC), the UK tax authority, and covers the universe of companies that file a 
corporate income tax return in the UK during the period 2001/2002-2009/2010.
 15
 UK tax 
returns are filed on an unconsolidated basis.  
 
The tax return data provides precise information on the tax position of each company in each 
period. However, it contains little information on financial statement variables. In particular, 
it does not contain information on debt or interest payments. We therefore merge the tax 
return data with the unconsolidated accounting data from the financial statement database 
FAME (provided by Bureau van Dyjk) by the company identification number and the end 
dates of the tax-returns and the financial statements.
16
  FAME provides information from 
balance sheets and income statements.
17
 As the capital structure of financial companies is a 
rather different concept from that of non-financial companies, we exclude the financial sector 
from our analysis.  
 
We use information from balance sheets to construct the leverage ratio, defined as the sum of 
short-term and long-term debt expressed as a proportion of total debt and book equity.
18
 We 
drop company-year observations where the leverage ratio exceeds 100% or is below 0%. 
Theories of capital structure suggest that the leverage ratio depends on a number of factors. 
For example, the trade-off theory predicts that larger and more tangible companies are likely 
to use more debt (for example, Bradley et al., 1984). On the other hand, the pecking-order 
theory of capital structure suggests a negative correlation between companies' profitability 
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 The UK corporate tax return form is called the CT600 form.  
16
 Each firm is assigned a unique identifier (ID) in both the tax return data and the accounting data by the 
HMRC. We use this firm ID to carry out the matching. We keep only firms with 12 months in each accounting 
period, which are the majority of firms in our sample. 
17
 We only keep the years when companies report unconsolidated accounts in FAME. 
18
 As the majority of firms in our sample are private, we do not observe the market value of their equity. Hence, 
book equity is included in the denominator of the leverage ratio.  
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and leverage ratio (for example, Myers and Majluf, 1984). We include company size, 
tangibility and profitability as our main control variables since these have been found to be 
among the most reliable factors for explaining leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2009; and Graham 
and Leary, 2011). We measure company size as the logarithm of the book value of total 
assets, tangibility as the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets and profitability as the 
ratio of after-tax earnings to total assets.
19
 Appendix A provides a detailed description of the 
variable construction for our empirical analysis. 
 
To construct Sample I we exclude companies that reported taxable losses at least once during 
the sample period. Sample II includes both loss-making and profit-making company-year 
observations. We require each company to have at least 4 consecutive years of observations 
after data-cleaning procedures.
20
 Sample I contains the unconsolidated accounts of 9,439 
companies and 51,051 company-year observations. Sample II contains 16,124 companies and 
93,259 company-year observations. Table II provides summary statistics for leverage ratio, 
size, tangibility, profitability, and the marginal tax rate measured in different ways for the 
two samples. Of course, companies in Sample I reported higher average taxable profits and 
profitability. Nonetheless, we do not find the average size and tangibility to be very different 
in our two samples.  
 
B.    Descriptive Analysis of Leverage Ratio and Marginal Tax Rate 
 
Figure 2 plots the time-series of the unweighted average leverage ratio for companies in 
Sample I, using both the unbalanced panel and a balanced panel where companies in Sample 
I are required to have 9 years of contiguous observations between 2001/2002 and 
2009/2010.
21
 For the balanced panel (solid line), the unweighted average leverage ratio 
declined gradually during the sample period. The dotted line for the unbalanced panel 
exhibits a similarly declining pattern although less prominent, which suggests that there are 
either entries of companies with higher leverage ratio or exit of companies with lower 
leverage ratio during this period.  
 
                                                          
19
 To eliminate outliers, we drop company-year observations that are in the top and bottom 1% of the 
distributions of these control variables.  
20
 This is necessary for carrying out the GMM estimations as explained later. All firms in Sample I are also 
included in Sample II.  
21
 A similar pattern is observed when we plot the average leverage ratio of firms in Sample II. There are 755 
firms and 6,795 observations in the balanced panel. 
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Figure 2. Unweighted average leverage ratio 2001/2002-2009/2010 (Sample I).  The unbalanced 
sample consists of 9,439 companies and 51,051 observations during the fiscal years 2001/2002-
2009/2010. The balanced sample consists of 755 companies and 6,795 observations with all 9 years of 
observations during the same period. Leverage ratio is defined as Total debt/(Total debt+Book 
equity).    
 
Figure 3 plots the distribution of companies’ statutory marginal tax rates for the period 
2001/2002-2009/2010; the left panel shows the after-financing marginal tax rate and the right 
panel the before-financing marginal tax rate.
22
 These histograms show rich variation in both 
measures of marginal tax rates across companies.
23
 We present the histogram of the after-
financing marginal tax rate for companies in Sample II in Appendix B. 
 
With the presence of company-specific fixed effects, we rely for identification on time-series 
variation in the marginal tax rate faced by individual companies. Table III reports the 
transitional probability matrix for companies’ taxable profits from year t-1 to year t shown 
separately for Sample I and Sample II. There is some persistence in allocations to tax 
brackets for firms in both samples. For firms in Sample I, the probability of staying within the 
same tax bracket from period t-1 to period t is around 70%-80%. Similar analysis of Sample 
II indicates the persistence of firms’ loss-making status-when companies are in the loss-
making position in period t-1, with around 70% probability it would remain non-taxable in 
                                                          
22
 It is worth pointing out that firms with taxable profits below £10,000 during the fiscal year 2002/2003 to 
2005/2006 had zero statutory marginal tax rate, which explains the mass at zero in Figure 3. 
23
 As the summary statistics in Table II suggests, both the mean and the median of the before-financing marginal 
tax rate are higher than those of the after-financing marginal tax rate. This indicates that firms’ marginal tax rate 
is reduced by using debt. 
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period t.
24
 Nevertheless, there is still considerable time-series variation in companies' tax 
status as suggested by the non-zero off-diagonal figures in Table III. 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of the after- and the before-financing marginal tax rate (Sample I). The 
sample consists of 9,439 companies and 51,051 observations during the fiscal years 2001/2002-
2009/2010. The left panel shows the distribution of the after-financing marginal tax rate, calculated 
based on firms’ taxable profits filed in the tax returns (Box 37, CT600). The right panel shows the 
distribution of the before-financing marginal tax rate, calculated based on firms’ taxable profits before 
deducting interest expenses. We obtain interest expenses from the database FAME. 
 
As a further check, Table IV reports the number of tax status changes within companies, 
separately for the two samples. For Sample I, around a quarter of companies never changed 
their tax brackets.
25
 Around 28% of companies changed their location on the tax rate 
schedule once and more than 20% of companies changed their location on the rate schedule 
at least three times. As one of the most significant kinks in the tax rate schedule is at 
£300,000, we further calculate how often companies in Sample I move in and out of the tax 
bracket for profits above £300,000. Around 35% of companies in Sample I moved into or out 
of this tax bracket at least once during the sample period. For Sample II, around 80% of firms 
changed tax bracket at least once during the sample period. As we include loss-making firm-
year observations in Sample II, we calculated how often firms shifted into or out of taxable 
loss. Our calculation shows that although the tax loss status is likely to persist, we still 
                                                          
24
 This suggests that as the loss status is rather persistent over time, the measurement errors in the simulated 
marginal tax rate will also be persistent, which in turn may lead to biased estimates of the tax effect on capital 
structure in a simple static capital structure model. 
25
 These serve as the control group in our estimations. 
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observe around half of the companies in Sample II moving in or out of taxable losses at least 
once during the sample period. 
 
 
III. Benchmark Results Using Kinks for Identification 
 
A. Benchmark Analysis 
 
We begin our estimation using our main identification strategy and Sample I. We allow for a 
dynamic adjustment model of leverage specified as Equation 1, where  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the leverage 
ratio of company i in year t; 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the after-financing marginal corporate income tax rate 
faced by company i in year t; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables, including size, tangibility, 
and profitability; 𝜇𝑖 is an unobserved company-specific fixed effect; 𝜃𝑡 is a time effect; and 
𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is an unobserved company-level, time-varying shock. 
 
(1) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
It has been documented in the previous literature that the leverage ratio is highly persistent 
over time (Lemmon et al., 2008), as companies move only gradually towards their optimal 
leverage due to the existence of adjustment costs (Fisher et al., 1989; and Lemmon et al., 
2008).
 
 This feature of the capital structure has not been widely incorporated into the analysis 
of the effects of corporation tax on leverage and most previous studies instead estimate a 
static model (for example, Graham, 1996a; Graham et al., 1998; and Faccio and Xu, 2013).
26
 
With the presence of adjustment costs, however, it is more reasonable to estimate a dynamic 
adjustment model of capital structure as specified as in (1), which allows us to estimate the 
long-run size of the effect of corporation tax on leverage but also how quickly companies 
respond to changes in tax incentives. 
 
Re-arranging (1), we obtain an error-correction specification: 
 
(2) ∆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ( 𝛼1 − 1)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝛽1 + 𝛽2)𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝛾1 + 𝛾2)𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽1∆𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1∆𝑍𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
                                                          
26
 More recent studies on the effects of tax on leverage of banks have estimated similar dynamic models (see, 
Keen and de Mooij, 2015). 
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where the long-run effect of the corporate tax rate on leverage is given by 
β1+β2
1−α1
, and (1 − α
1
) 
measures the convergence speed of the leverage ratio towards its long-run target.
27
 Similarly, 
the long-run effect of other control variables in (2) is measured as 
γ1+γ2
1−α1
. Implicitly, we 
assume that there is a linear long-run relationship between optimal leverage, the marginal tax 
rate, and size, tangibility and profitability.  
 
Table V reports the estimation results based on the error-correction model specified as in (2) 
using Sample I.
28
 Column 1 presents results using OLS. In this and all our subsequent 
analysis, we include a set of common year dummies to control for any common business 
cycle effect on leverage. Lemmon et al. (2008) point out that unobserved company-specific 
fixed effects are important for explaining companies' capital structure. In column 2 we 
control for company-specific fixed effects using the Within-Groups (WG) estimator. As 
discussed in Section 1, the endogeneity of the contemporaneous after-financing marginal tax 
rate may bias the estimated coefficient on ∆𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡  ( 𝛽1)  as well as other estimated 
coefficients in (2) including the estimated long-run tax effect on leverage. Indeed, in both 
Columns 1 and 2, the estimated long-run coefficient on the after-financing marginal tax rate 
is negative and significant, contrary to predictions of the trade-off theory of capital 
structure.
29
  
 
To investigate the endogeneity of the contemporaneous after-financing marginal tax rate, we 
plot the distribution of firms’ taxable income based on Sample I in Appendix C. Figure C.1 
shows the number of firms in each bin of taxable income based on the tax returns. Without 
kinks in the corporate tax rate schedule, the distribution of taxable income is likely to be 
smooth. However, we observe significant bunching of taxable income around the £300,000 
threshold in Figure C.1. To have a closer look, Figures C.2-C.5 plot the distribution of 
taxable income around the £10,000, £50,000, £300,000, and £1,500,000 thresholds, 
respectively (red line). These detailed figures further confirm the observation in Figure C.1 
that bunching of taxable income mostly occurs around the £300,000 threshold. However, 
                                                          
27
 Equation 2 is similar to the partial adjustment model reported in Lemmon et al. (2008). 
28
 We obtain similar results without controlling for firm size, tangibility, and profitability. The results are 
available upon request. 
29
 For comparability, we have applied the OLS and the WG estimation using the sample employed for the GMM 
estimations, with similar results. The sample using the GMM is smaller because we need a longer time series 
when lagged values of the covariates are used as instruments. Some companies are dropped because they do not 
have enough observations available.  
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these figures show that taxable income also bunches around other kink points on the 
corporate tax rate schedule, although to a lesser degree. Interestingly, when we focus on the 
before-financing taxable income (light brown bars), its distribution appears to be smooth 
around all the kink points. Nevertheless, the distribution of taxable income before deducting 
capital allowances (and after deducting interest expenses) is also smooth (dark brown line). 
Hence, it appears that firms use both debt and capital allowances to shift into a lower tax 
bracket. 
 
Graham (1996a) and Graham et al. (1998) argue that the current before-financing marginal 
tax rate can be used to instrument after-financing marginal tax rate. However, this is true only 
if the before-financing marginal tax rate is not affected by unobserved shocks in 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 . In 
Column 3, we report the Instrumental Variables (IVs) estimation of (2) when 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is 
instrumented by the current, the first, second, and third lags of the before-financing marginal 
tax rate.
 30
 The estimated long-run coefficient on the statutory marginal tax rate remains 
negative, and the Hansen test clearly rejects the null hypothesis that these instruments are 
valid.
31
  
 
As alternative instruments for the contemporaneous after-financing marginal tax rate, in 
Column 4 we use the second and the third lags of the after-financing marginal tax rate.
32
 The 
rationale for using the lags of the after-financing marginal tax rate as instruments is as 
follows. Since taxable profits are persistent over time, the lagged marginal tax rates should be 
informative about the current marginal tax rate. However, historical taxable profits are less 
likely to be correlated with current unobserved shocks that affect the availability of internal 
funds and taxable income in year t, provided that such shocks are transitory.  
 
Using these lags as instruments, the estimated coefficient on  ∆𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡  and the estimated 
long-run tax effect both become positive and significant, consistent with the prediction of the 
trade-off theory. The estimated long-run tax effect on leverage is around 0.4, suggesting that 
a 10 percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate will lead to a 4 percentage points 
                                                          
30
 We use the STATA command "xtivreg2" to conduct the Instrumental Variables estimations, which controls 
for firm-level fixed effects. 
31
 The Hansen test of the null hypothesis that these instruments are exogenous provides a p-value of 0.000, 
indicating strong rejection of the null. 
32
 We cannot include the first lag of the after-financing marginal tax rate in the set of instruments as it is already 
a covariate in Equation 2. 
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increase in leverage. The Kleibergen-Paap rank test for weak instruments and the Hansen test 
results indicate that the second and third lags of the after-financing marginal tax rate are both 
informative and valid instruments. 
 
In Column 5, we repeat the exercise in Column 4 but use as instruments the second and the 
third lags of the before-financing marginal tax rates instead of the second and the third lags of 
the after-financing marginal tax rates. The Hansen test again suggests that these are valid 
instruments. Together with Column 3, this result suggests that the contemporaneous before-
financing marginal tax rate is correlated with unobserved shocks in the error term. We 
continue to obtain a positive and significant long-run coefficient on the statutory marginal tax 
rate, of around 0.87.
33
  
 
The estimated convergence speed differs considerably using the OLS and the WG 
estimators.
34
 It is well known that for a short panel dataset like the one used here, the OLS 
estimator with the presence of company-specific fixed effects creates an upward bias in the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. In contrast, the WG estimator creates 
a downward bias. Such a bias may also confound other estimated coefficients. To deal with 
this problem, in Columns 6 and 7 we apply the GMM estimator.
35
 More specifically, we use 
lags of the leverage ratio dated at t-3 and t-4 as instruments for ∆Levi,t−1.
36
 We also treat the 
current after-financing marginal tax rate and other control variables as endogenous and use 
the lags of these variables dated at t-3 and t-4 as instruments.  
 
                                                          
33
 The estimate has a larger standard error than that reported in Column 4. This is unsurprising since the before-
financing marginal tax rate is not perfectly correlated with the after-financing marginal tax rate.  
34
 Previous studies also estimate a range of adjustment speed for firms’ capital structure. For example, Fama and 
French (2002) find a positive, significant, but slow adjustment speed when they estimate a dynamic capital 
structure model using the OLS estimator (0.07-0.1 for non-dividend paying firms, 0.15-0.18 for dividend paying 
firms). Flannery and Rangan (2006) find a much faster adjustment speed (around 0.3) using the mean-
differencing estimator. Lemmon et al. (2008) also find a larger adjustment speed (around 0.25) using the GMM 
estimator.    
35
 We conduct the GMM estimation using the STATA command xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009). 
36
 We choose to use the third and the forth lags of these variables as instruments based on the serial correlation 
test results shown at the bottom of Table V. If the error term ϵi,t is not serially correlated, we would reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no AR(1) type of serial correlation in the first-differenced equation, and we would 
accept the null hypothesis that there is no higher order of serial correlation in the error term of the first-
differenced equation. Since the null hypothesis that there is no AR(2) type of serial correlation in the first-
differenced error term is clearly rejected, it suggests that only the third or further lags of the leverage ratio, as 
well as of other control variables, could be valid instruments. 
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In Column 6, we obtain a convergence speed around 0.24, which is close to that in the 
previous literature.
37
 The point estimate on  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1  in Column 6 lies between the OLS 
estimate in Column 1 and the WG estimate in Column 2, consistent with the existence of an 
upward bias in the OLS estimations and a downward bias in the WG estimations.
38
 The point 
estimate for the coefficient on 𝑀𝑇𝑅i,t−1 is around 0.18, which is significant at the 5 percent 
level. This translates into a long-run coefficient of around 0.76, suggesting that a 10 
percentage points increase in the marginal tax rate will lead to a 7.6 percentage points 
increase in leverage. This tax effect is much larger than that reported in, for example, Graham 
et al. (1998). Nevertheless, as we obtain a large standard error for this long-run coefficient, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated long-run tax effect in Column 6 is 
equal to that in Column 4.
39
 
 
In Column 7, we instead instrument the contemporaneous after-financing marginal tax rate by 
the before-financing marginal tax rate dated at t-3 and t-4.
40
 We obtain a larger long-run 
coefficient on the statutory marginal tax rate in this specification of around 1.4. However, the 
standard error also rises and the null hypothesis that the estimated long-run tax effects on 
leverage in Columns 6 and 7 are equal cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level.  
 
B. Which Tax Rate matters? Marginal Tax Rate versus Average Tax Rate 
 
Recent studies find that many firms employ the more salient average tax rate to make capital 
structure decisions rather than the theoretically correct marginal tax rate (Graham et al., 
2015). One of the argument is that the average tax rate is more salient to managers and the 
marginal tax rate is more difficult to calculate. We test this hypothesis based on firms in 
Sample I. To construct the average effective tax rate (AETR), we divide the total amount of 
corporate tax paid by the amount of taxable income.
41
  On average, firms in Sample I paid 
around 23% of their pre-tax income in the form of corporate taxes during the sample period. 
                                                          
37
 For example, Lemmon et al. (2008) estimated the speed of convergence to be around 0.25 in their GMM 
estimations, using a sample of US listed non-financial companies. 
38
 When we estimate the model using the OLS and WG estimators based on the same sample as for the GMM 
estimation, the convergence speed is -0.1 in the OLS estimation and -0.69 in the WG estimation. 
39
 The t test of the null hypothesis that these two long-run coefficients are equal yields a t statistic of 0.867. This 
is unsurprising as we use the third and the forth lags of the after-financing marginal tax rate as instruments, 
which are not strongly correlated with the contemporary after-financing marginal tax rate. 
40
 Again, the Hansen test of the exogeneity of the instrument set is strongly rejected when we include the before-
financing marginal tax rate dated at t, t-1, and t-2 in the set of instruments.  
41
 Both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio are obtained from the tax returns. 
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In Table VI, we analyze whether the effective average tax rate or the marginal tax rate 
matters for firms’ long-run capital structure. To ease comparison, in Column 1, we report the 
GMM estimation result of Column 9 of Table V, where we use only the marginal tax rate as 
the proxy for tax incentives for using debt. In Column 2, we instead use only the average 
effective tax rate as the proxy. We do not find any long-run effect of the AETR on firms’ 
capital structure. In Column 3, we regress leverage on both the marginal tax rate and the 
average effective tax rate and interestingly, we continue to find a significant long-run effect 
of the marginal tax rate on firms’ capital structure but no effect from the AETR. These results 
suggest that firms in our sample use the theoretically correct marginal tax rate for their capital 
structure decisions instead of the more salient average effective tax rate. 
 
IV. Comparison with Previous Studies 
 
Our analysis so far has provided evidence for a large and positive effect of taxation on a 
company’s long-run capital structure, consistent with the prediction of the trade-off theory. 
The magnitude of our estimated long-run tax effect on leverage is much larger than that 
found by previous studies. As mentioned above, our analysis differs considerably from 
previous studies in terms of identification strategies (using kinks in the corporation tax rate 
schedule compared to using only asymmetric tax treatment between profits and losses), data 
sources (tax returns compared to accounting data), model specifications (a dynamic model 
compared to a static model), and consolidation rules (unconsolidated data compared to 
consolidated data). In this section, we try to identify which aspects of our approach are most 
important for the differences in our results compared to the previous literature.  
 
In Section IV.A, we use additional variation in the marginal tax rate due to the asymmetric 
tax treatment between profits and losses to identify the effect of taxation on capital structure. 
In Section IV.B, we compare the explanatory power of two marginal tax rates, one based on 
tax returns and the other based on financial statements. In Section IV.C, we estimate a static 
and a lag distributed model of capital structure. In Section IV.D, we distinguish between 
companies’ external and internal leverage, and also distinguish between domestic stand-alone 
companies and those that are a part of a multinational corporation group.  
 
A.  Identification Based on the Asymmetric Tax Treatment Between Profit and Loss  
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Many previous studies use variation in the simulated marginal tax rate due to the asymmetric 
tax treatment between profit and loss for identification (notably Graham 1996a, 1996b, and 
Graham et al., 1998). Loss-making firms may be able to carry losses back to the previous 
period, in which case the effective marginal tax rate is the statutory rate of the previous 
period. However, in most cases, firms must carry forward losses to set against profit in later 
years, in which case the effective marginal tax rate in the loss-making period depends on the 
expectation of when they will become taxable again. UK firms are allowed to carry losses 
back for 12 months or forward indefinitely.
42
 We consider two alternative approaches to 
measuring the marginal tax rate: in Columns 1-4 in Table VII, we assume that companies do 
not take into account any losses carried forward or backward and simply set the marginal tax 
rate to zero. In Columns 5-9, we use the “perfect-foresight” marginal tax rate, assuming firms 
can fully anticipate their future tax status. We provide more detail about the construction of 
the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate in Appendix D.
 43
 
 
Columns 1-4 of Table VII report the OLS, WG, IV, and GMM estimation results based on 
Equation 2.
44
 The results are similar to our benchmark analysis in Table V. We find a 
negative and significant long-run coefficient on the after-financing marginal tax rate in the 
OLS and the WG estimations. Controlling for the endogeneity of the after-financing marginal 
tax rates in the IV estimation in Column 3, we again find a positive long-run tax effect on 
companies' leverage ratio – here of around 0.42 and significant at the 1 percent level. Dealing 
with the endogeneity of the lagged leverage ratio and other control variables in the GMM 
estimation in Column 4, we find a long-run tax effect on the leverage ratio of around 1.04, 
which is significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
Columns 5-8 repeat this exercise using the “perfect-foresight” after-financing marginal tax 
rate. The results in Columns 5-8 are similar to those in Columns 1-4. In the GMM estimation 
in Column 8 we find a positive and significant long-run tax effect of around 0.98. One 
concern about this “perfect-foresight” marginal tax rate is that, as explained in more details in 
Appendix D, we impose strong assumption about the first and the last observations for each 
                                                          
42
 Note that companies are also, subject to some limitations, able to set losses in one company against profit in 
another company in the same group, in which case, the relevant tax rate is in principle that of the group member 
to which losses are transferred. We do not observe the recipient company. However, only around 5% of firms in 
our sample are part of a UK domestic group.  
43
Due to confidentiality concerns, we cannot report the histogram of the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate. 
44
 In this table, we use the same sample for the OLS, WG and the GMM estimations. Similar results are obtained 
for the OLS and WG estimations when we use the full sample. 
20 
 
company if it is in a loss-making position in those years. For the first year we do not observe 
whether the company carries losses backwards; for the last year we do not observe how long 
it takes before the company reaches a tax-paying position. In Column 9 we repeat the 
approach of Column 8, but omitting the first and the last observations. The long-run 
coefficient on the “perfect-foresight” marginal tax rate in Column 9 has a similar magnitude 
to that reported in Column 8. 
    
B. Marginal Tax Rate Based on Tax Returns: A Better Measure to Capture Capital Structure 
Tax Incentives? 
 
The major advantage of using tax return data to study the effects of corporate taxes on capital 
structure is that it provides accurate information on companies' tax status.  Table VIII 
illustrates the correspondence between the taxable income reported in the tax return data and 
the estimated taxable income based on the accounting data from FAME, using both samples. 
It reveals considerable discrepancies between these two data sources. This discrepancy is 
particularly severe when a company makes a loss — only around 50% of companies making 
a loss according to tax return data show a loss in accounting data. This suggests that using 
companies’ financial statements to simulate variation in the marginal tax rate is likely to 
generate large measurement errors. 
 
Table IX reports the correlations between different measures of the marginal tax rate: the 
after-financing and the before-financing marginal tax rates calculated based on tax return data 
and based on FAME. We find a partial correlation of around 0.688 between the after-
financing marginal tax rate based on tax returns and that based on financial statements, and a 
similar correlation for before-financing marginal tax rates (insert the specific correlation 
coefficient – see my previous comment as well). Consistent with Table VIII, these figures 
suggest considerable differences between the marginal tax rates based on tax returns and that 
based on financial statements. 
 
Our observation of the discrepancies between companies’ actual taxable income and that 
estimated based on companies’ financial statement is consistent with the large literature on 
the existence of book-tax differences (for example, Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Cloyd et al., 
1996; Plesko, 2000; Manzon and Plesko, 2001; Mills and Newberry, 2001; and Desai, 2003). 
Such book-tax differences arise due to different accounting rules for tax and for financial 
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reporting. Tax and financial reporting may have different rules for revenue and expenses 
recognition, such as how capital expenditures are depreciated, which leads to temporary 
book-tax differences. Permanent book-tax differences arise as revenue or expenses are 
accrued under one system but not the other. As the tax returns and financial statements are 
prepared for different purposes, companies have some incentive to report low taxable income 
to the tax authority, and to report high income in their financial statements. Although large 
book-tax differences may increase the probability of being audited by tax authorities, 
previous studies suggest that companies do not always conform their financial statements to 
their tax reports.
45
 
 
Such discrepancies between the tax returns and the financial statements suggest that the 
marginal tax rate based on the tax return data is likely to better capture the true tax incentives 
for borrowing. Contrary to this intuition, Graham and Mills (2008) find that the simulated 
(before-financing) marginal tax rate based on financial statements captures the tax incentives 
for capital structure better than the corresponding marginal tax rate based on actual tax 
returns for a sample of US companies. This could be due to at least two reasons. First, it is 
possible that companies respond more to the tax position declared in their financial 
statements than their true tax position, since the accounting position is what is publicly 
disclosed. Alternatively, however, the finding could be explained by the difference in the 
consolidation rules between the tax and accounting data in their study, as discussed 
previously. Since our tax return data and the accounting data are both unconsolidated, we 
avoid this inconsistency.  
 
To test our hypothesis, in Table X we compare the GMM estimation results of Equation 2 
using two versions of the after-financing marginal tax rate: the first obtained according to 
companies' tax returns (MTR) and the second obtained according to their financial statements 
(MTR
A
).
46
 Column 1 reproduces column 6 of Table V, using the MTR and our main approach 
on Sample I. Column 2 shows the effect of instead using MTR
A
. In Column 2, we do not find 
any significant tax effect on leverage. The estimated coefficient is substantially lower than in 
Column 1, and the standard error is higher. We obtain similar results in Columns 3 and 4 
when we instrument the after-financing marginal tax rate by the before-financing marginal 
                                                          
45
 Cloyd et al. (1996) and Mills and Newberry (2001) find that book-tax differences exist for both public and 
private firms, although private firms appear to conform their financial statements with tax returns more. 
46
 For succinct presentation, we only report the estimated convergence speed, the long-run coefficients on 
different measures of the marginal tax rate, and relevant test results.  
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tax rate. We have also compared the two approaches without controlling for company size, 
tangibility, and profitability, and we again obtain the same conclusion.  
 
The results are more mixed using Sample II. In Columns 5 and 6 we compare results when 
we set the MTR to zero in the period in which the company makes a loss. In this case, the 
estimate of the long-run effect of tax on leverage is positive and significant also when we use 
the financial statement data (Column 6). However, even in this case, the coefficient is lower, 
and the standard error higher, than in the case in which we use tax return data. Finally, when 
using the “perfect foresight” MTR, based on Column 9 of Table VII, the estimate using the 
financial statement data is again insignificant due to a high standard error.  
 
Overall, these results suggest strongly that marginal tax rates calculated using tax return data 
better capture the corporate tax incentives for capital structure, when the tax returns and 
accounting data are based on the same consolidation rules. Importantly, using our first sample 
and main identification strategy, the estimated long-run tax effect on leverage ratio is close to 
zero in Columns 2 and 4. Based on the results of Columns 2 and 4, without the availability of 
tax return data, we would therefore conclude that there is little impact of the marginal tax rate 
on capital structure.  
 
C. Static and Lag Distributed Models 
 
In this section, we estimate a static model and a distributed lag model of capital structure. 
Most existing empirical studies of the impact of taxation on leverage estimate a static capital 
structure model (for example, Graham 1996a, 1996b; Graham et al., 1998; Graham and Mills, 
2008; and Faccio and Xu, 2013). To compare our study to previous work, we also estimate a 
static model as in (3): 
 
(3) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
This static model assumes that companies adjust immediately their leverage ratio towards the 
new equilibrium in response to any shocks. This is in contrast to the corporate finance 
literature, in which it has been pointed out that companies only adjust their capital structure 
infrequently (see, Fisher et al., 1989; and Hovakimian et al., 2001; and Flannery and Rangan, 
2006). Comparing the static model with the error correction model, we restrict the 
23 
 
coefficients on all lagged variables in (1) to be zero in the static model. According to our 
results above, these restrictions are not valid. We are therefore estimating the static model 
primarily to investigate the size of its bias.  
 
As an alternative way of investigating the nature of the adjustment of capital structure, we 
also estimate a distributed lag model as follows: 
 
(4) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛾1𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3𝑍𝑖,𝑡−2+𝛾4𝑍𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
The sum of 𝛽1,𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝛽4 is the long-run tax effect on leverage in this specification. This 
distributed lag model can be viewed as a specification between the static model in (3) and the 
error-correction model specified in (2). If the dynamic adjustment takes a long time, we 
would need to include further lags of the variables on the right-hand side of (4), although this 
would be empirically difficult as we only have a short panel. In contrast, the error-correction 
model used in our main specification is a more parsimonious specification than the lag 
distributed model and it allows us to estimate the long-run tax effect on leverage using a short 
panel of data. 
 
Table XI reports the IVs estimation results based on (3) and (4), using Sample I and II 
separately. We use lags of the after-financing marginal tax rate as instruments for the current 
after-financing marginal tax rate, although similar results are obtained when we use the lags 
of the before-financing marginal tax rate as instruments instead. Details of these instruments 
are provided at the bottom of Table XI. For sample I, in Column 1, we obtain a positive and 
precisely estimated coefficient on 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 of around 0.6 from the static model where all the 
control variables are dated at time t. To deal with the potential endogeneity of the control 
variables other than the tax measure, previous studies often include those variables dated at t-
1 on the right-hand side. In Column 2, when all control variables are dated at t-1, we obtain a 
smaller positive coefficient on MTRi,t  of around 0.4. This suggests that the static model 
appears to bias downward the coefficients compared to the error-correction model.  
 
In Column 3, we report the results based on the distributed lag model. Note that the 
difference between the distributed lag model and the error correction model is that we do not 
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include the lagged leverage ratio on the right-hand side of the lag distributed model. All the 
coefficients on the current and on the lags of the after-financing marginal tax rate are 
positive, and the coefficients on MTRi,t  and MTRi,t−2  are both significant. We also find 
significant coefficients on companies’ profitability, size, and tangibility dated prior to year t. 
We repeat these analyses using Sample II and the results are reported in Columns 4-6. Again, 
we observe the coefficients on the lags of the marginal tax rate to have explanatory power on 
the company’s current leverage ratio in Column 6. These results provide some evidence that 
companies adjust their capital structure in response to changes in their marginal tax rate over 
time and hence, it would be more appropriate to estimate a dynamic adjustment capital 
structure model than a static model. 
 
D. External Leverage: Domestic versus Multinational Companies 
 
So far our analysis focused on how corporate taxes affect companies’ overall leverage. Since 
we use unconsolidated financial statements to construct the leverage ratio to match with the 
unconsolidated tax returns, for companies that are a part of a corporate group, our measure of 
leverage is the sum of external and internal leverage.
47
 By contrast, most previous studies 
have estimated the tax effects on companies’ consolidated data, implying that they consider 
only external debt.
48
 To compare our study with previous work, we now consider only 
external leverage. 
 
We further distinguish between domestic stand-alone companies, companies that are part of a 
UK group, and companies that are part of a multinational group. We make such a distinction 
for two reasons. First, in our sample around 70% of companies are stand-alone companies, 
and it is of policy interest to analyse the effects of taxation for such smaller, domestic stand-
alone companies. This is generally not possible using data on public companies since they 
tend to be part of large groups. Second, multinational companies may have more 
sophisticated debt policies than domestic stand-alone companies.
49
 In particular, they may 
have the opportunity to borrow externally in different jurisdictions, and allocate internal debt 
                                                          
47
 External debt is borrowed from unconnected, third parties such as commercial banks or other financial 
institutions. Internal debt is borrowed from connected entities in the same corporate group. 
48
 This is because most studies construct the leverage ratio using the consolidated balance sheets of listed firms. 
One exception is Desai et al. (2004) who study how taxes affect the external and internal leverage of 
subsidiaries of US multinational firms. The authors found that internal leverage is more sensitive to local tax 
rates. 
49
 For example, multinational firms can allocate their debt internally across different tax jurisdictions to reduce 
their worldwide tax liabilities (see, for example, Desai et al., 2004). 
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so that high tax subsidiaries are financed by low tax entities in the same group.
50
 The tax 
effect on the external leverage of multinational groups may therefore differ from that for 
domestic stand-alone companies.
51
 
 
We identify whether a company is a domestic stand-alone or a part of a multinational group 
using information on companies' ownership structure from FAME.
52
 More specifically, 
FAME records whether a company is independent or not.
53
 If a company is not independent, 
we know the name and location of its global ultimate owner. We define a company to be a 
part of a multinational group if it satisfies one of the following criteria: 1) the company itself 
is independent and it has foreign subsidiaries outside of the UK; 2) it is a subsidiary of a 
group with a UK ultimate owner and which has foreign subsidiaries; 3) it is a subsidiary of a 
group with a non-UK ultimate owner. We define a company to be part of a domestic 
corporation group if: 1) it is independent and has only domestic subsidiary; 2) or it is a 
subsidiary of a group with a UK ultimate owner and which has no foreign subsidiary. We 
define the rest of the companies to be domestic stand-alone companies. It is worth noting that 
for domestic stand-alone companies defined this way, the ownership information is missing 
in FAME. This is consistent with the hypothesis that FAME only collects ownership 
information for companies that are part of a group. Table XII presents summary statistics, for 
these three different groups of companies, for both Sample I and II.  
 
Panel A of Table XII reports the summary statistics of key variables for UK domestic stand-
alone companies, companies that are part of a UK domestic group, and companies that are 
part of a multinational group, based on Sample I. Around 70% of companies in Sample I are 
UK domestic stand-alone companies, and around 26% of companies are part of a 
multinational group. These figures for Sample II are 65% and 28%, respectively. Panel B of 
Table XII reports the same set of statistics for different groups of companies in Sample II. 
We define the internal leverage ratio as the ratio between the internal debt and the sum of 
                                                          
50
 For example, Huizinga et al. (2008) show that a foreign subsidiary’s capital structure reflects local corporate 
tax rates and the tax rate differences between the parent firm and other foreign subsidiaries. 
51
 Most countries have some form of thin capitalisation rule to combat excessive use of debt by subsidiaries of 
multinational companies. The UK does have such rules, though they are generally weaker than in other 
countries (Blouin et al., 2013).  
52
 A caveat of our approach is that the ownership information is only available for the most recent year for each 
firm in FAME. Therefore, we need assume that firms’ ownership structures did not change during the sample 
period. 
53
 We define a company to be independent if no other company owns more than 50% of its total shares. 
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total debt and book equity.
54
 For domestic stand-alone companies, the internal debt is almost 
always zero. For example, for our second sample, at the 75% percentile, companies do not 
have any internal debt at all. The mean internal leverage ratio is around 5% for these 
companies, considerably lower than 16% for companies that are part of a domestic group and 
19% for companies that are part of a multinational group. The non-zero mean of internal 
leverage for this group of firms can be explained as the ownership status might have changed 
in the sample period and we cannot track this. 
 
Table XII shows that domestic stand-alone companies are smaller than those belonging to a 
multinational group. To make sure that there is variation in the marginal tax rate for the two 
groups of companies, we present the histograms of different measures of marginal tax rates 
and the number of tax status changes within companies for these two groups in Appendix E. 
We observe rich variation in companies’ tax status for both groups. We also find that 
companies that belong to a multinational group change their tax brackets more frequently 
than domestic stand-alone companies.
55
  
 
Table XIII presents the GMM estimation results when the external leverage ratio instead of 
the overall leverage ratio is the dependent variable in Equation 2. We find a strong positive 
long-run tax effect on companies’ external leverage when we pool different types of 
companies together (Columns 1 and 4). We do not report the result using the sample of firms 
that are part of a domestic group as they only consist of around 5% of the whole sample. We 
continue to find positive and substantial long-run tax effect on capital structures when we 
focus on domestic stand-alone companies (Columns 2 and 5). Companies that are part of a 
multinational group also increase their external leverage ratio when facing a higher marginal 
tax rate (Columns 3 and 6). We obtain somewhat mixed result comparing the sensitivity of 
external leverage toward changes in the tax incentives between the two types of firms. Based 
on Sample I, the estimated long-run tax effect on external leverage for the two types of firms 
are similar in terms of magnitude (1.000 in Column 2 versus 1.104 in Column 3). However, 
based on Sample II, we find the external leverage of firms that are part of a multinational 
group is much less sensitive to changes in tax incentives than that of domestic stand-alone 
firms (0.285 in Column 6 versus 0.920 in Column 5). This latter result is consistent with the 
                                                          
54
 The external and internal debt information is reported in FAME. 
55
 For example, the proportion of firms that always stayed above or below the £300,000 threshold in Sample I 
and the proportion of firms that always make taxable profits (or taxable losses) in Sample II are both lower for 
multinational firms.  
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hypothesis that there is possible substitution between external and internal debt for companies 
that belong to a multinational group, as discussed in Desai et al. (2004).
56
 Interestingly, we 
also find that companies that are a part of multinational group adjust their external leverage 
ratio much faster than domestic stand-alone companies (0.34 versus 0.27 based on Sample I, 
and 0.49 versus 0.29 based on Sample II). This suggests that the affiliation to a multinational 
corporation group helps reduce companies’ adjustment costs associated with external 
borrowing. 
 
V. Discussions and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we analyse the effects of corporation tax on companies’ capital structure. We 
combine data from confidential tax return data and financial statements for a panel of UK 
companies during the fiscal years 2001/2002-2009/2010. Our main identification relies on the 
existence of kinks in the corporate tax rate schedule in the United Kingdom which create 
variation in companies’ incentives to borrow. Using a dynamic capital structure model we 
find a large and positive long-run effect of taxation on companies’ leverage ratio. Our 
findings provide strong support for the trade-off theory of capital structure.  
 
We find substantial differences between companies’ true taxable income and taxable income 
estimated using their financial statements. We also find that the marginal tax rate according 
to the former has better explanatory power for companies’ capital structures than the 
marginal tax rate based on the latter.  Although we also identify positive and substantial 
corporation tax effects on leverage ratio in the framework of a static capital structure model, 
we provide evidence that companies gradually adjust their capital structure in response to 
changes in their marginal tax rates. Finally, we find evidence that corporate tax incentives 
affect the external leverage of both domestic and multinational companies. If a higher 
external leverage ratio leads to higher risk of financial distress or bankruptcy, our findings 
have important welfare implications and contribute to the on-going debate on whether 
preferential tax treatment for debt financing over equity financing contributes to instability in 
the economy.  
 
 
                                                          
56
 To understand the tax effects on capital structure for firms that are a part of a multinational group, one needs 
to estimate a more sophisticated model in which firms can simultaneously choose how much to borrow 
externally and internally, which is beyond the scope of the current study. 
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Table I: Statutory Marginal Tax Rates and Tax Brackets: 2001-2009 
This table displays the statutory marginal corporate income tax rates and the corresponding tax 
bracket for UK companies during the fiscal years 2001/2002-2009/2010. A graphical illustration is 
provided by Figure 1 in the main text. 
Taxable profits 2001/2002 
2002/2003 to  
2005/2006 
2006/2007 2007/2008 
2008/2009-
2009/2010 
0-10,000 10% 0% 19% 20% 21% 
10,001-50,000 22.5% 23.75% 19% 20% 21% 
50,001-300,000 20% 19% 19% 20% 21% 
300,001-1,500,000 32.5% 32.75% 32.75% 32.5% 29.75% 
>1,500,000 30% 30% 30% 30% 28% 
  
Table II: Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Panel A summarizes the statistics of key variables for firms in Sample I, which consists of 9,439 
companies and 51,051 observations. We calculate the mean, the standard deviation (S.D.), the first 
quartile, the median, and the third quartile of firms’ taxable profits, after-financing marginal tax rate 
(MTR), before-financing MTR, size, tangibility, profitability, and leverage ratio. Panel B summarize 
the statistics of the same set of variables for firms in Sample II, which consists of 16,124 companies 
and 93,259 observations. Definitions of these key variables are provided in Appendix A. 
 
A: Excluding loss-making observations (Sample I) 
Variables Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 No. obs. 
Taxable profits 561,260 2,344,378 39,551 138,420 401,850 51,051 
After-financing MTR 0.227 0.080 0.190 0.210 0.300 51,051 
Before-financing MTR 0.244 0.067 0.190 0.238 0.330 51,051 
Size 14.590 1.639 13.430 14.826 15.651 51,051 
Tangibility 0.430 0.320 0.146 0.353 0.706 51,051 
Profitability 0.086 0.104 0.026 0.055 0.108 51,051 
Leverage 0.462 0.261 0.249 0.446 0.663 51,051 
B: Including loss-making observations (Sample II) 
Variables Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 No. obs. 
Taxable profits 362,042 1,838,355 0.000 40,504 229,999 93,259 
After-financing MTR 0.156 0.122 0.000 0.190 0.238 93,259 
Perfect-foresight MTR 0.183 0.108 0.178 0.196 0.238 93,259 
Size 14.771 1.672 13.649 14.931 15.798 93,259 
Tangibility 0.444 0.320 0.156 0.386 0.726 93,259 
Profitability 0.056 0.101 0.007 0.036 0.083 93,259 
Leverage 0.502 0.264 0.291 0.500 0.715 93,259 
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Table III: Transitional Probability Matrix of Taxable Profits from Year t-1 to Year t 
Panel A reports the transitional probability of taxable profits from one year to the next for firms in 
Sample I. For confidentiality reason, we groups observations in Sample I into three tax brackets: 0-
£50,000, £50,000-300,000, >£300,000. Each number in the diagonal indicates the probability of the 
firm stays in the same tax bracket from year t-1 to year t. Each off-diagonal number indicates the 
probability of the firm switching from one tax bracket to a different one from year t-1 to year t. Panel 
B reports the transitional probability of taxable profits for firms in Sample II, including those making 
taxable losses. 
A. Sample I 
  
Taxable  Profits 
 t  
£0-50,000 £50,000-300,000 >£300,000 
 £0-50,000 73.68% 23.04% 3.28% 
t-1 £50,000-300,000 14.05% 68.25% 17.7% 
 >£300,000 2.6% 17.47% 79.93% 
 
B. Sample II: 
  
Taxable  Profits 
  t  
  Loss £0-50,000 £50-300,000 >£300,000 
   Loss 69.57% 16.04% 9.62% 4.77% 
t-1 £0-50,000 19.98% 59.02% 18.30% 2.70% 
 £50,000-300,000 11.55% 13.81% 58.96% 15.68% 
  >£300,000 8.79% 2.89% 16.40% 71.93% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table IV: Number of Tax Status Changes within Companies 
This table shows information on the number of times companies changed tax brackets. For both 
Sample I and Sample II we indicate how many companies do not change tax brackets at all, or change 
once, twice or more than twice.  
 
Sample I: Total number of tax status changes 
Number of 
changes 
Number of 
companies 
Percent of total 
companies 
Number of 
observations 
Percent of total 
observations 
0 2,385 25.30% 11,946 23.40% 
1 2,618 27.70% 13,419 26.29% 
2 2,450 26.00% 12,987 25.44% 
>=3 1,986 21.10% 12,699 24.88% 
Total 9,439 100% 51,051 100% 
Sample I: Total number of moving in and out of the £300,000 tax bracket 
0 6,167 65.34% 32,001 62.68% 
1 1,506 15.96% 8,173 16.01% 
2 1,145 12.13% 6,508 12.75% 
>=3 621 6.58% 4369 8.56% 
Total 9,439 100% 51,051 100% 
Sample II: Total number of tax status changes 
0 3,308 20.50% 16,882 18.10% 
1 3,449 21.40% 17,836 19.13% 
2 4,091 25.40% 22,274 23.88% 
>=3 5,276 32.72% 36,267 38.89% 
Total 16,124 100% 93,259 100% 
Sample II: Total number of moving in and out of taxable losses 
0 8,063 50.01% 44,041 47.22% 
1 3,977 24.67% 22,414 24.03% 
2 2,700 16.75% 16,705 17.91% 
>=3 1,384 8.58% 10,099 10.83% 
Total 16,124 100% 44,041 47.22% 
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Table V: Estimated Tax Effects on Leverage Based on Equation 2: Sample I 
We report estimation results based on the error-correction model of capital structure as Equation 2: 
(2) ∆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ( 𝛼1 − 1)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝛽1 + 𝛽2)𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝛾1 + 𝛾2)𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽1∆𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1∆𝑍𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
We use Sample I for this table, which consists of 9,439 profit-making companies during the fiscal 
years 2001/2002-2009/2010. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the firm i’s leverage ratio in year t, defined as (Total debt/Total 
debt+Book Equity). 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the after-financing marginal tax rate (MTR) that firm i faced in year t. 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of non-tax firm-level characteristics including firm size, tangibility, and profitability. 
Column 1 reports the OLS estimation result based on Equation 2. Column 2 reports the Within-Group 
estimation result when we control for firm-specific fixed effect. In Column 3, we instrument the 
current after-financing MTR by the current, the first to the third lags of the before-financing MTR. In 
Column 4, we instrument the current after-financing MTR by the second and the third lags of the 
after-financing MTR. In Column 5, we instrument the current after-financing MTR by the second and 
the third lags of the before-financing MTR. In Columns 6-7, we estimate Equation 2 using the GMM 
estimator, and we include the third and the forth lags of all the explanatory variables on the right-hand 
side of Equation 2 in the set of instruments. In Columns 6, the after-financing MTR is instrumented 
by its lags. In Column 7, the after-financing MTR is instrumented by the lags of the before-financing 
MTR. In all Columns, a set of year dummies are included. We compute the long-run coefficients on 
the after-financing MTR, profitability, size, and tangibility.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent  OLS WG IVs IVs IVs GMM GMM 
variable: ∆Levi,t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Levi,t−1 -0.110*** -0.619*** -0.732*** -0.737*** -0.742*** -0.238*** -0.222*** 
 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.034) (0.034) 
 MTRi,t−1 -0.058*** -0.073*** -0.107** 0.294** 0.643** 0.182** 0.310*** 
 
(0.010) (0.016) (0.044) (0.135) (0.276) (0.083) (0.106) 
Profitabilityi,t−1 -0.133*** -0.568*** -0.562*** -0.641*** -0.710*** -0.272 -0.323* 
 
(0.011) (0.023) (0.043) (0.051) (0.071) (0.193) (0.190) 
Sizei,t−1 -0.001** 0.046*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.121* 0.113* 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.072) (0.069) 
Tangibilityi,t−1 0.004** 0.088*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.114*** -0.268* -0.272** 
 
(0.002) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.137) (0.129) 
∆MTRi,t -0.103*** -0.076*** -0.097*** 0.272** 0.593** 0.203* 0.196 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.035) (0.124) (0.255) (0.116) (0.137) 
∆Profitabilityi,t -0.451*** -0.512*** -0.473*** -0.542*** -0.603*** -0.163 -0.222 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.029) (0.038) (0.057) (0.249) (0.236) 
∆Tangibilityi,t 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.088*** 0.092*** 0.096*** -0.164 -0.082 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.166) (0.156) 
∆Sizei,t 0.107*** 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.102 0.112 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.073) (0.076) 
Long-run coefficients    
    
MTR -0.525*** -0.118*** -0.146** 0.399** 0.867** 0.764** 1.397** 
 
(0.091) (0.026) (0.060) (0.183) (0.370) (0.379) (0.564) 
Profitability -1.202*** -0.917*** -0.768*** -0.870*** -0.958*** -1.144 -1.455 
 
(0.103) (0.039) (0.059) (0.069) (0.093) (0.828) (0.890) 
Size -0.011** 0.074*** 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.507* 0.511* 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.296) (0.304) 
Tangibility 0.034** 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.151*** 0.154*** -1.127* -1.229** 
 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.586) (0.605) 
Hansen test   0.017 0.416 0.948 0.754 0.713 
Weak instrument   0.000 0.000 0.000     
F-statistics   799.232 121.863 24.813     
AR(1)    
  
0.000 0.000 
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AR(2)    
  
0.001 0.000 
AR(3)    
  
0.620 0.728 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 9,439 9,439 9,439 9,439 9,439 9,439 9,439 
No. of obs. 41,612 41,612 32,173 32,173 32,173 32,173 32,173 
R-squared 0.178 0.424 0.450 0.432 0.384 NA NA 
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Table VI: The Effects of MTR and AETR on Capital Structure (Sample I) 
This table presents the GMM estimation results based Equation 2. Column 1 is identical to Column 7 
in Table V. In Column 2, we replace MTR by AETR in Equation 2. AETR is the firms’ average 
effective tax rate, which is constructed by dividing total corporate income taxes paid by the amount of 
taxable income. In Column 3, we include both  AETRi,t−1and ∆AETRi,t on the right-hand side of 
Equation 2 as additional explanatory variables.  We include the third and the forth lags of all the 
explanatory variables in each specification in the set of instruments for the GMM estimations. In all 
Columns, a set of year dummies are included. We compute the long-run coefficients on the after-
financing marginal tax rate and the average effective tax rate.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dependent  GMM GMM GMM 
variable: ∆Levi,t (1) (2) (3) 
 Levi,t−1 -0.222*** -0.234*** -0.239*** 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
 MTRi,t−1 0.310***  0.198** 
 
(0.106)  (0.092) 
 AETRi,t−1  0.046 -0.006 
  (0.086) (0.040) 
Profitabilityi,t−1 -0.323* -0.243 -0.318 
 
(0.190) (0.196) (0.193) 
Sizei,t−1 0.113* 0.104 0.100 
 
(0.069) (0.068) (0.061) 
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.272** -0.282** -0.218* 
 
(0.129) (0.123) (0.116) 
∆MTRi,t 0.196  0.213* 
 
(0.137)  (0.112) 
∆AETRi,t  0.027 -0.006 
  (0.048) (0.020) 
∆Profitabilityi,t -0.222 -0.173 -0.205 
 
(0.236) (0.256) (0.233) 
∆Tangibilityi,t -0.082 -0.199 -0.152 
 
(0.156) (0.161) (0.157) 
∆Sizei,t 0.112 0.086 0.115* 
 
(0.076) (0.078) (0.070) 
Long-run coefficients 
 
  
MTR 1.397**  0.832** 
 
(0.564)  (0.406) 
AETR   0.196 -0.024 
 
  (0.375) (0.169) 
Hansen test 0.713 0.727 0.874 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR(3) 0.728 0.757 0.635 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Company FE Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 9,439 9,439 9,439 
No. of obs. 32,173 32,173 32,173 
 
 
 
Table VII: Estimated Tax Effects on Leverage: Sample II 
We report estimation results based on the error-correction model of capital structure as Equation 2 using Sample II, which consists of 16,124 companies 
during the fiscal years 2001/2002-2009/2010. In Columns 1-4, we use the statutory after-financing marginal tax rate as a proxy for the corporate tax 
incentives for using debt. In Columns 5-9, we use the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate as a proxy for the corporate tax incentives for using debt. In the IVs 
estimations in Column 3 (or 7), we instrument the current after-financing MTR by the second and the third lags of the after-financing statutory (or perfect-
foresight) MTR. All variables are defined as in Table V, and PMTRi,t denotes the “perfect-foresight” MTR for firm i in year t. In the GMM estimations in 
Column 4 (or 8), we instrument the current after-financing MTR by the third and the forth lags of the after-financing statutory (or perfect-foresight) MTR, and 
we also include the third and the forth lags of all other right-hand side variables in the set of instruments. In Column 9, we drop the first or the last observation 
for each company if it reported a taxable loss, and conduct the GMM estimation with the smaller sample. A set of common year dummies are included in all 
columns. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Statutory MTR "Perfect-foresight" MTR 
Dependent  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
variable: ∆Levi,t OLS WG IVs GMM OLS WG IVs GMM GMM 
 Levi,t−1 -0.099*** -0.629*** -0.663*** -0.250*** -0.097*** -0.630*** -0.655*** -0.247*** -0.203*** 
 
(0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.024) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.024) (0.026) 
 MTRi,t−1 -0.098*** -0.119*** 0.280*** 0.261*** 
  
 
  
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.057) (0.054) 
  
 
   PMTRi,t−1 
  
 
 
-0.071*** -0.100*** 0.356*** 0.242*** 0.226*** 
   
 
 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.087) (0.062) (0.079) 
Profitabilityi,t−1 -0.238*** -0.721*** -0.946*** -0.376*** -0.257*** -0.750*** -0.938*** -0.268* -0.435** 
 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.041) (0.144) (0.011) (0.019) (0.042) (0.141) (0.193) 
Sizei,t−1 -0.002*** 0.043*** 0.050*** -0.003 -0.002*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.026 0.033 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.006) (0.055) (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) (0.051) (0.081) 
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.004** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.027 -0.004*** 0.056*** 0.056*** -0.036 -0.193** 
 
(0.001) (0.010) (0.013) (0.079) (0.001) (0.010) (0.013) (0.072) (0.084) 
∆MTRi,t -0.114*** -0.086*** 0.322*** 0.359*** 
  
 
  
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.058) (0.107) 
  
 
  ∆PMTRi,t 
  
 
 
-0.111*** -0.077*** 0.493*** 0.361*** 0275*** 
   
 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.110) (0.121) (0.127) 
∆Profitabilityi,t -0.551*** -0.613*** -0.786*** -0.558*** -0.577*** -0.636*** -0.741*** -0.490*** 0.275** 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.033) (0.181) (0.012) (0.013) (0.029) (0.164) (0.127) 
∆Tangibilityi,t 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.037 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.035 -0.647*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.114) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.107) (0.224) 
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∆Sizei,t 0.116*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.062 0.116*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.074 -0.079 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.070) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.067) (0.120) 
Long-run coefficients 
  
 
   
 
 
  
MTR -0.991*** -0.189*** 0.423*** 1.044*** 
  
 
  
 
(0.050) (0.015) (0.085) (0.243) 
  
 
  PMTR 
  
 
 
-0.731*** -0.160*** 0.543*** 0.980*** 1.115** 
   
 
 
(0.053) (0.018) (0.134) (0.279) (0.443) 
Profitability -2.397*** -1.145*** -1.428*** -1.504** -2.649*** -1.190*** -1.432*** -1.084* -2.146** 
 
(0.118) (0.034) (0.063) (0.591) (0.120) (0.033) (0.068) (0.575) (0.939) 
Size -0.020*** 0.068*** 0.075*** -0.012 -0.022*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.107 0.162 
 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.218) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.209) (0.409) 
Tangibility -0.037** 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.109 -0.040*** 0.089*** 0.086*** -0.144 -0.951** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.315) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.294) (0.459) 
Weak Inst. 
  
0.000   
  
0.000     
Hansen test 
 
 
0.759 0.121 
  
0.242 0.079 0.607 
AR(1) 
  
 0.000 
  
 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 
  
 0.004 
  
 0.002 0.000 
AR(3) 
  
 0.888 
  
 0.592 0.330 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 16,124 16,124 16,124 16,124 16,124 16,124 16,124 16,124 15,158 
No. of obs. 61,011 61,011 61,011 61,011 61,011 61,011 61,011 61,011 50,906 
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Table VIII: Correspondence between Tax Returns and Accounting Data in terms of Companies’ Taxable Profits  
We observe companies’ taxable profits in the tax returns and estimate their taxable profits based on the financial statements. We then calculate the 
correspondence of tax brackets between the tax returns and the accounting data. For confidentiality reason, we group the tax brackets £0-10,000 and £10,000-
50,000 together. For firms in each tax bracket according to the tax returns (CT600), we calculate the percentages of these firms in different tax brackets 
according to the estimated taxable profits based on firms’ financial statements. Figures in each row would add up to unity. Taxable income is reported as zero 
in CT600 if the firm makes zero or negative taxable income. 
Sample I 
  Accounting data (FAME)  
 Taxable Profits Loss £0-50,000 £50,000-300,000 >£300,000 
 £0-50,000 8% 74% 14% 4% 
CT600 £50,000-300,000 2% 7% 80% 11% 
 >£300,000 1% 0% 9% 90% 
Sample II 
  Accounting data (FAME)  
 Taxable Profits Loss £0-50,000 £50,000-300,000 >£300,000 
 Loss 49.2% 16.5% 17.6% 16.7% 
CT600 £0-50,000 10.4% 66.7% 17.1% 5.9% 
 £50,000-300,000 2.4% 7.1% 78% 12.5% 
 >£300,000 1.1% 0.3% 8.7% 89.9% 
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Table IX: Correlation between Different Versions of the Marginal Tax Rate  
(Sample I) 
In this table, we calculate the partial correlations between different versions of the marginal tax rate. 
MTR is the after-financing marginal tax rate, calculated based on companies’ taxable profits (Box 37 
in CT600) in the tax returns. 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 is the before-financing marginal tax rate, calculated based on 
companies’ taxable profits reported in the tax returns plus interest expenses. 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝐴  is the after-
financing marginal tax rate calculated based on the estimated taxable profits according to companies’ 
financial statement. 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝐴  is the before-financing marginal tax rate calculated based on the 
estimated taxable profits before interest deduction according to financial statements. We calculate 
these partial correlations using Sample I, which consists of 9,439 companies and 51,051 observations 
during the fiscal years 2001/2002-2009/2010. 
 
 
MTR 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝐴 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝐴  
MTR 1 
   𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 0.703 1 
  𝑀𝑇𝑅𝐴 0.688 0.594 1 
 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝐴  0.618 0.737 0.773 1 
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Table X: Which Marginal Tax Rate Better Capture Tax Incentives for Borrowing? 
Comparison of the GMM Estimation Results 
We report the GMM estimation results of Equation 2 where we calculate the marginal tax rate based 
on either the tax returns or the financial statements. Columns 1-4 are estimation results of Equation 2 
based on Sample I, and Column 5-8 are estimation results of Equation 2 based on Sample II. In all 
these GMM estimations, we include the third and the forth lags of leverage ratio, marginal tax rate 
and other control variables in the set of instruments. In Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, we instrument the 
current after-financing MTR by the third and the forth lags of the after-financing MTR. In Columns 3-
4, we instrument the current after-financing MTR by the third and the forth lags of the before-
financing MTR. In Columns 7-8, we instrument the current perfect-foresight MTR (PMTR) by its 
third and fourth lags. To reduce measurement errors in the PMTR, we drop the first and the last 
observations if the company was in the loss-making position according to either the tax returns 
(Column 7) or the financial statements (Column 8). Year dummies and company-specific fixed effects 
are included in all columns. Short-run dynamics are included in each column. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: ∆Levi,t 
Sample I Sample II 
After-financing statutory MTR 
After-financing statutory 
MTR 
Perfect foresight MTR 
PMTR 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) 
 
 (8) 
Convergence speed        
 Levi,t−1 -0.238*** -0.248*** -0.222*** -0.241*** -0.250*** -0.245*** -0.203*** -0.211*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
Long-run coefficients       
MTR 0.764**   1.397**  1.044***      
 (0.379)   (0.564)  (0.243)      
MTRA  0.063  0.499  0.639**   
  (0.455)  (0.603)  (0.291)   
PMTR       1.115**  
       (0.443)  
PMTRA        0.958 
        (0.601) 
Hansen test 0.754 0.535 0.713 0.702 0.383 0.125 0.607 0.567 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(3) 0.620 0.762 0.728 0.763 0.438 0.411 0.330 0.269 
No. of groups 9,439 9,439 9,439 9,439 16,124 16,124 15,158 15,747 
No. of obs. 32,173 32,173 32,173 32,173 61,011 61,011 50,906 54,797 
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Table XI: Estimated Tax Effects on Leverage based on the Static and the Lag 
Distributed (LD) Model 
We estimate a static capital structure model in Columns 1 and 4 specified as Equation 3: 
(3) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
Where MTR is the after-financing marginal tax rate based on companies’ tax returns, and Z includes 
firm size, tangibility, and profitability. We estimate Equation 3 using the two-stage least square 
estimator. We use up to the forth lags of the after-financing MTR as instruments for the current after-
financing MTR. In Columns 3 and 6, we estimate a lag distributed model of capital structure specified 
as Equation 4: 
(4) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛾1𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3𝑍𝑖,𝑡−2+𝛾4𝑍𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
We estimate Equation 4 using the two-stage least square estimator. More specifically, we use the forth 
lag of the after-financing MTR together with the third and the forth lags of the before-financing MTR 
as instruments for the current after-financing MTR since the after-financing MTR dated at t-1, t-2, and 
t-3 are already included on the right-hand side. In Column 6, we use the forth and the fifth lags of the 
after-financing MTR together with the third, the forth and the fifth of the perfect-foresight MTR as 
instruments for the current after-financing MTR. We control for firm-level fixed effect and a set of 
common year dummies in all these columns. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Sample I Sample II 
Dependent  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
variable: Levi,t Static Static LD Static Static LD 
            
 MTRi,t 0.601** 0.351** 0.346** 0.289*** 0.219*** 0.293*** 
 
(0.133) (0.153) (0.162) (0.086) (0.058) (0.096) 
 MTRi,t−1  
 
0.027  
 
-0.009 
 
 
 
(0.030)  
 
(0.017) 
MTRi,t−2  
 
0.052*  
 
0.059*** 
 
 
 
(0.028)  
 
(0.020) 
MTRi,t−3  
 
0.027  
 
0.034** 
 
 
 
(0.021)  
 
(0.016) 
Profitabilityi,t -0.533*** 
 
-0.554*** -0.654*** 
 
-
0.758*** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.046) (0.046) 
 
(0.062) 
Profitabilityi,t−1 
 
-0.159*** -0.274*** 
 
-0.233*** 
-
0.422*** 
 
 (0.026) (0.037)  (0.019) (0.034) 
Profitabilityi,t−2 
 
 
-0.179*** 
 
 
-
0.316*** 
 
 
 
(0.032)  
 
(0.031) 
Profitabilityi,t−3 
 
 
-0.138*** 
 
 
-
0.197*** 
 
 
 
(0.029)  
 
(0.026) 
Sizei,t 0.103*** 
 
0.115*** 0.090*** 
 
0.113*** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.014) (0.009) 
 
(0.012) 
Sizei,t−1  0.041*** -0.004  0.036*** -0.013* 
 
 (0.008) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Sizei,t−2  
 
-0.020**  
 
-0.009 
 
 
 
(0.008)  
 
(0.006) 
Sizei,t−3 
 
 
-0.042*** 
 
 
-
0.034*** 
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(0.008)  
 
(0.007) 
Tangibilityi,t 0.114*** 
 
0.075*** 0.071*** 
 
0.048*** 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) (0.016) 
 
(0.017) 
Tangibilityi,t−1  0.090*** 0.058***  0.060*** 0.022 
 
 (0.018) (0.019)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Tangibilityi,t−2  
 
0.027  
 
0.019 
 
 
 
(0.019)  
 
(0.014) 
Tangibilityi,t−3  
 
-0.014  
 
-0.006 
 
 
 
(0.019)  
 
(0.014) 
Long-run tax 
effect 
 
 
0.452** 
 
 
0.378*** 
   (0.203)   (0.135) 
Weak 
instrument 
  
    
  
    
(F-statistics) 263.718 114.106 34.551 229.817 184.937 31.756 
Hansen test 0.582 0.627 0.679 0.055 0.240 0.648 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 5,632 5,632 3,467 10,646 10,646 5,041 
No. of obs. 18,927 18,927 11,130 28,764 28,764 15,938 
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Table XII: Summary Statistics of Key Variables for Domestic and Multinational 
Companies 
We calculate the summary statistics of key variables for three sub-samples of firms: the UK 
domestic stand-alone firms, firms that are a part of a UK domestic group, and firms that are a part 
of a multinational group. 
 
A: Sample I 
Domestic stand-alone  Mean 
 
S.D. p25 p50 p75 No. Obs. 
Taxable profits  290,360 948,854 28,391 93,775 279,522 34,645 
Size 14.124 1.557 12.934 14.289 15.272 34,645 
Tangibility 0.461 0.328 0.163 0.394 0.774 34,645 
Profitability 0.092 0.114 0.026 0.056 0.115 34,645 
Total leverage 0.470 0.264 0.253 0.453 0.675 34,645 
Internal leverage ratio 0.050 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 34,645 
Companies belonging to a domestic group  
Taxable profits  
 
      681,761 1,738,484 73,445 214,395 602,303 2,821 
Size 
 
15.414 1.282 14.626 15.363 16.123 2,821 
Tangibility 
 
0.434 0.321 0.151 0.350 0.735 2,821 
Profitability 
 
0.062 0.064 0.020 0.046 0.086 2,821 
Total leverage 
 
0.476 0.251 0.271 0.470 0.668 2,821 
Internal leverage ratio 0.115 0.194 0.000 0.005 0.155 2,821 
Companies belonging to a multinational group 
Taxable profits  
 
1,227,098 4,134,946 109,937 318,880 850,636 13,585 
Size 
 
15.608 1.358 14.861 15.506 16.303 13,585 
Tangibility 
 
0.350 0.285 0.111 0.270 0.522 13,585 
Profitability 
 
0.073 1.358 0.026 0.055 0.098 13,585 
Total leverage 
 
0.440 0.285 0.232 0.422 0.633 13,585 
Internal leverage ratio 0.142 0.222 0.000 0.013 0.213 13,585 
 
 B: Sample II 
Domestic stand-alone  Mean 
 
S.D. p25 p50 p75 No. Obs. 
Taxable profits  
 
194,761 781,047 0.000 34,094 161,268 59,978 
Size 
 
14.245 1.566 13.069 14.432 15.351 59,978 
Tangibility 
 
0.476 0.325 0.178 0.430 0.784 59,978 
Profitability 
 
0.061 0.109 0.008 0.037 0.087 59,978 
Total leverage 
 
0.502 0.264 0.291 0.497 0.715 59,978 
Internal leverage ratio 0.050 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 59,978 
Companies belonging to a domestic group  
Taxable profits  
 
380,478 1,303,293 0.000 39,598 280,755 5,873 
Size 
 
15.519 1.370 14.672 15.454 16.352 5,873 
Tangibility 
 
0.473 0.335 0.163 0.412 0.808 5,873 
Profitability 
 
0.040 0.077 0.004 0.026 0.065 5,873 
Total leverage 
 
0.537 0.262 0.326 0.550 0.755 5,873 
Internal leverage ratio 0.158 0.238 0.000 0.028 0.232 5,873 
Companies belonging to a multinational group 
Taxable profits  
 
724,163 3,099,718 0.000 77,150 441,502 18,214 
Size 
 
15.763 1.427 14.904 15.634 16.524 18,214 
Tangibility 
 
0.369 0.292 0.117 0.299 0.565 18,214 
Profitability 
 
0.048 0.083 0.008 0.036 0.079 18,214 
Total leverage 
 
0.496 0.262 0.286 0.494 0.705 18,214 
Internal leverage ratio 0.190 0.257 0.000 0.048 0.328 18,214 
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Table XIII: Corporate Tax Effects on Companies’ External Leverage: Domestic versus 
Multinational Companies 
We report the GMM estimation results based on Equation 2 where the dependent variable is the first 
difference of companies’ external leverage ratio (ExLev). In Columns 1 and 4, we use all firms in 
Sample I or Sample II for the GMM estimations. In Columns 2 and 5, we run the GMM estimations 
using the sub-sample of domestic stand-alone firms. In Columns 3 and 6, we run the GMM 
estimations using the sub-sample of firms that are part of a multinational group. We include the third 
and the forth lags of leverage ratio, marginal tax rate and other control variables in the set of 
instruments. Firm-level fixed effect and year dummies are included in all columns. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Sample I  Sample II  
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
variable: ∆ExLevi,t Full 
sample 
Domestic 
stand 
 alone 
Multinationals 
Full 
sample 
Domestic 
stand  
alone 
Multinationals 
         
  
 ExLevi,t−1 -0.236*** -0.262*** -0.336*** -0.299*** -0.285*** -0.490*** 
 
(0.034) (0.040) (0.072) (0.029) (0.040) (0.067) 
 MTRi,t−1 0.177** 0.262** 0.371** 0.156*** 0.262*** 0.140* 
 
(0.080) (0.115) (0.161) (0.059) (0.079) (0.077) 
Profitabilityi,t−1 -0.265 -0.333* -0.061 -0.429*** -0.538*** -0.183 
 (0.173) (0.197) (0.282) (0.153) (0.189) (0.207) 
Sizei,t−1 0.047 0.010 -0.023 -0.112* -0.082 -0.076** 
 (0.067) (0.081) (0.067) (0.059) (0.072) (0.039) 
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.191 -0.099 -0.255 0.120 0.210* 0.065 
 (0.129) (0.142) (0.195) (0.084) (0.110) (0.084) 
∆MTRi,t 0.169 -0.047 0.241 0.263** 0.494*** 0.264** 
 (0.108) (0.146) (0.213) (0.114) (0.145) (0.110) 
∆Profitabilityi,t -0.207 -0.139 0.202 -0.461** -0.884*** -0.073 
 (0.214) (0.201) (0.298) (0.204) (0.229) (0.199) 
∆Tangibilityi,t -0.084 0.100 0.029 -0.083 0.061 -0.063 
 (0.160) (0.149) (0.212) (0.130) (0.127) (0.162) 
∆Sizei,t 0.068 0.044 0.039 0.015 0.060 -0.051 
 
(0.065) (0.086) (0.082) (0.075) (0.092) (0.043) 
Long-run coefficient  
MTR  0.749** 1.000** 1.104** 0.522** 0.920*** 0.285* 
 
(0.368) (0.498) (0.545) (0.214) (0.319) (0.167) 
Hansen test 0.280 0.295 0.594 0.066 0.067 0.060 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.000 0.000 0.615 0.001 0.000 0.919 
AR(3) 0.984 0.984 0.711 0.203 0.928 0.151 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 9,439 6,466 2,458 16,124 10,545 4,597 
No. of obs. 32,173 21,713 8,669 61,011 38,888 18,214 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Appendix A: Definition of variables 
 
Taxable income in tax returns: box 37 in CT600, which reports companies’ actual taxable 
income after deducting interest expenses. 
 
Estimated taxable income in financial statement: we estimate companies’ taxable income 
using financial statements by adding tax expenses to net income, which includes minority 
interest.  
 
Statutory after-financing marginal tax rate (MTR): this is calculated based on companies’ 
taxable income (either reported in tax returns or estimated based on financial statements, the 
latter is labelled as 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝐴) after deducting interest expenses. For loss-making companies, this 
measure equals to zero. 
 
Statutory before-financing marginal tax rate ( 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒) : this is calculated based on 
companies’ taxable income (either reported in tax returns or estimated based on financial 
statements, the latter is labelled as 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝐴 ) before deducting interest expenses. If a firm’s 
before-financing taxable profit is non-positive, this measure is set to be zero. 
 
Perfect-foresight after-financing marginal tax rate (PMTR): see details in Appendix D. The 
corresponding measure based on financial statements is labelled as  𝑃𝑀𝑇𝑅𝐴. 
 
Leverage ratio (LEV): this is defined as 
𝐿𝑇𝐷+𝑆𝑇𝐷
𝐿𝑇𝐷+𝑆𝑇𝐷+𝐵𝐸
, where LTD is long-term debt, STD is 
short-term debt, and BE is the value of the company’s book equity, all of which are obtained 
from companies’ balance sheets provided by FAME. 
 
Average effective tax rate (AETR): this is defined as the ratio between gross corporate income 
tax paid and taxable income. Both the numerator and the denominator are obtained from the 
tax returns. 
 
External leverage ratio (EXLEV): this is constructed as  
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
. Total debt is the sum of 
internal and external debt, both reported in FAME. 
 
Profitability: this is the ratio of net income (profits/loss for the period) to total assets. Both 
the numerator and the denominator are obtained from FAME. 
 
Tangibility: this is the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. Both the numerator and the 
denominator are obtained from FAME. 
 
Size: this is proxied as the logarithm of companies’ total assets. 
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Appendix B: Distribution of the marginal tax rate for Sample II  
 
The left panel of Figure B plots the distribution of the after-financing statutory marginal tax 
rate for companies in Sample II. We cannot measure the before-financing marginal tax rate 
for this sample as taxable profit reported in the tax returns is recorded as zero if a company 
makes a loss.
57
  In total, around 28% of company-year observations in this sample reported 
taxable losses. In the right panel of Figure B, we plot the distribution of the after-financing 
statutory marginal tax rate excluding loss-making observations from Sample II. As 
companies with taxable profits less than £10,000 were subject to a zero tax rate during the 
fiscal years 2002/2003 to 2005/2006, we still observe a mass at zero although this is a 
considerably smaller mass relative to that in the left panel of Figure B.  
 
Figure B: Distribution of the after-financing marginal tax rate (Sample II) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57
 When this paper was written, the tax return data did not provide sufficient information for calculating the total 
loss arising in each fiscal year. This would be a natural extension when such information becomes available in 
the future. 
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Appendix C: Distribution of taxable income 
In this appendix, we provide the histograms of taxable income based on Sample I to illustrate 
firms’ bunching behaviour. Figure C.1 shows the entire distribution of taxable income for 
firms in Sample I. Figures C.2-C.5 show the distribution of taxable income around the 
£10,000, £50,000, £300,000, and £1,500,000 thresholds, respectively. In Figures C.2-C.5, we 
distinguish between taxable income, before-financing taxable income, and taxable income 
before deducting capital allowances. 
 
Figure C.1: Distribution of taxable income (Sample I). 
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Figure C.2 Distribution of taxable income around the £10,000 threshold (Sample I) 
 
 
Figure C.3 Distribution of taxable income around the £50,000 threshold (Sample I) 
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Figure C.4 Distribution of taxable income around the £300,000 threshold (Sample I) 
 
Figure C.5 Distribution of taxable income around the £1,500,000 threshold (Sample I) 
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Appendix D: Construction of the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate 
 
To construct the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate, we make the following assumptions. If 
the company is in a loss-making position in year t-1 and year t, the company must carry 
forward its current taxable losses until year t+s when taxable profit becomes positive for the 
first time. In this case, we set the effective marginal tax rate to be MTRt+s (1 + r)
s⁄ , where  
MTRt+s is the statutory after-financing marginal tax rate the company would face in year t+s. 
The discount rate r is set to be 7% which is the average interest rate for companies in our full 
sample.
58
 If the company is instead able to carry backward its taxable losses to year t-1, we 
assume that it takes time for the company to obtain tax refund from the tax authority and set 
the marginal tax rate to be MTRt−1 (1 + r)⁄ .  
 
We need to make strong assumptions to calculate the perfect-foresight marginal tax rate as 
we only observe up to 9 years for each company. If the company makes losses every year we 
assume its marginal tax rate to be zero. This is a stronger assumption when imposed on the 
first and the last observations for each company. If the company makes a loss in the first year, 
we do not know whether the company can carry backward the current losses. If the last 
observation is in a loss-making position, we do not know whether the company carries 
forward its losses or not. As a result, there may be larger measurement errors in these cases. 
This is the rationale to omit the first and the last observations as a robustness check in our 
estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
58
 We experimented with a discount rate of 5% or 2% and the results are not affected. 
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Appendix E: Distribution of the marginal tax rate by ownership  
 
In this appendix, we provide histograms of the after-financing marginal tax rate for firms 
with different ownership types, for Sample I and Sample II, respectively. For Sample II, we 
provide the histograms for the after-financing MTR with and without loss-making firm-year 
observations, separately. We also calculate the number of tax status changes within each firm 
over time in Table E. 
 
Figure E.1: Distribution of the after-financing MTR by ownership, Sample I 
 
Figure E.2: Distribution of the after-financing MTR by ownership, Sample II 
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Table E: Number of Tax Changes within Companies, by ownership 
Sample I: Total number of moving in and out of the £300,000 tax bracket 
Multinational companies 
Number of 
changes 
Number of 
companies 
Percent of total 
companies 
Number of 
observations 
Percent of total 
observations 
0 1,273 51.79% 6,750 49.69% 
1 578 23.52% 3,111 22.90% 
2 384 15.62% 2,160 15.90% 
>=3 223 9.08% 1,564 11.51% 
Total 2,458 100% 13,585 100% 
Domestic companies 
0 4,894 70.1% 25,251 67.40% 
1 928 13.29% 5,062 13.51% 
2 761 10.90% 4,348 11.61% 
>=3 549 5.70% 2,805 7.00% 
Total 6,981 100% 37,466 100% 
Sample II: Total number of moving in and out of losses 
Multinational companies 
0 2,155 46.88% 12,081 44.08% 
1 1,185 25.78% 6,817 24.87% 
2 803 17.47% 5,106 18.63% 
>=3 454 9.87% 3,404 12.42% 
Total 4,597 100% 27,408 100% 
Domestic companies 
0 5,908 51.25% 31,960 48.53% 
1 2,792 24.22% 15,597 23.69% 
2 1,897 16.46% 11,599 17.61% 
>=3 930 8.07% 6,695 10.17% 
Total 11,527 100% 65,851 100% 
 
